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Is The Right to Education Fundamental?
Lori Anne Harper*
No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention
above all to the education of youth; for the neglect of education
does harm to the constitution.'
-- Aristotle
I. INTRODUCTION
Education is essential to individual development. Through ed-
ucation, society enables its citizens to participate fully in commu-
nity activities as well as in the political processes.2 The 1972 Mon-
tana Constitution sets forth Montana's commitment to educate its
citizens:
It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education
which will develop the full educational potential of each person.
Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person
of the state .... The legislature shall provide a basic system of
free quality public elementary and secondary schools.'
Montana's Constitution clearly requires that the state provide each
* The author would like to thank Professors Thomas P. Huff and Larry M. Elison for
their helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors or omissions, however, are strictly the
author's alone.
1. ARISTOTLE, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, bk. VIII, ch. 1, 1(cited in Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under State
Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 101 n.32 (1989) [hereinafter Hubsch]).
2. "[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments.... It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities .... It
is the very foundation of good citizenship." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954). See also Hubsch, supra note 1, at 95.
3. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1.
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Montana citizen with a quality education."
Article X, section 1 (the Education Clause) creates a constitu-
tionally protected territory that the Montana Supreme Court in-
vaded in a 1986 decision, State ex rel. Bartmess v. Board of Trust-
ees.' In Bartmess, the court upheld a rule which denies both
equality of educational opportunity and a quality education to a
select group of high school students in Helena, by forbidding them
to participate in extracurricular activities.' Bartmess gave the
court the opportunity to find, within the Education Clause, a fun-
damental right to education. Unfortunately, the court failed to do
so.7 Instead, the court purposely limited its discussion to the status
of "students' right to participate in existing extracurricular activi-
ties,"8 even though extracurricular activities and academics are tra-
ditionally closely connected.' The court's reluctance to expand its
discussion beyond student participation in extracurricular activi-
ties leaves two questions unsettled: (1) the status of the right to
education in Montana, and (2) the meaning of "education" in the
Education Clause.
This comment traces the development of Montana's education
clause from its basis in the 1889 Montana Constitution to its enu-
meration in the 1972 Montana Constitution. The comment then
discusses Bartmess, focusing on the Montana Supreme Court's
failure to characterize the right to education as fundamental in
Montana, and how that failure denied a select group of high school
students in Helena both equality of educational opportunity and a
quality education. Finally, the comment analyzes the effects of
Bartmess' divergence from past precedent, and its failure to ac-
4. "The legislature shall provide ... quality public ... schools." MONT. CONST. art. X,
§ 1(3) (emphasis added). "Because of this overriding importance of education, the commit-
tee recognizes the awesome task of providing the appropriate Constitutional provisions nec-
essary to protect and nurture the public educational system .... The committee views these
proposed changes as vital to the quality and efficiency of education in Montana." II MON-
TANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS 721 (1972) (Education and Public Lands
Committee Proposal X) (emphasis added) [hereinafter TRANSCRIPTS].
5. 223 Mont. 269, 726 P.2d 801 (1986). See infra part III and accompanying text for a
discussion of Bartmess.
6. Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 271-72, 726 P.2d at 802.
7. The Bartmess court stated:
We are not ruling upon the issue of whether or not the right to education itself is
a fundamental right. We are not ruling upon whether the failure to offer any ex-
tracurricular activities may result in a constitutional deprivation, nor whether ex-
tracurricular activities are in any way an indispensable component of the basic
system of free quality public education.
Id. at 272, 726 P.2d at 802. But see infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
8. Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 275, 726 P.2d at 805.
9. Id. at 281-85, 726 P.2d at 808-11 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
510 [Vol. 51
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knowledge that extracurricular activities are fundamental to Mon-
tana's educational system.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The 1889 Constitution
The 1889 Montana Constitution created a duty to "establish
and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public,
free, common schools,"10 a duty to provide an education to the
children of Montana. This deceptively simple constitutional man-
date commanded the attention of the Montana Supreme Court.
For example, in McNair v. School District No. 1,11 the court an-
swered an important question: "What, then, constitutes a 'thor-
ough' system of education in our public schools?' 1 2 In McNair, the
court struck down a taxpayer's objections to the construction of a
gymnasium and an athletic field, stating that "[e]ducation may be
particularly directed to either mental, moral, or physical powers or
faculties, but in its broadest and best sense it embraces them
all." 3 The McNair court defined education as "the totality of the
qualities acquired through individual instruction and social train-
ing, which further happiness, efficiency and [the] capacity for so-
cial service."' 4 The McNair court thus interpreted the 1889 educa-
tion clause as a guarantee to the citizens of Montana that the state
would provide an educational system encompassing academics as
well as extracurricular activities. The court, however, did not label
the right to education as fundamental.
More than thirty years later in Moran v. School District No.
7,15 a United States District Court judge acknowledged the impor-
tance the Montana Supreme Court had given to extracurricular ac-
tivities in McNair: "[The] Montana Supreme Court has recognized
the importance of extracurricular activities as an integral part of
the total education process."' 6 In Moran, a married high school
senior challenged a statute which prevented married high school
students from participating in extracurricular activities. The fed-
eral district court, applying the 1889 Montana Constitution,
granted a preliminary injunction to Moran, holding that "the right
to attend school includes the right to participate in extracurricular
10. MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XI, § 1 (emphasis added).
11. 87 Mont. 423, 288 P. 188 (1930).
12. Id. at 428, 288 P. at 190.
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. Id. (citation omitted).
15. 350 F. Supp. 1180 (1972).
16. Id. at 1184 (emphasis added).
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activities. ' 17 In doing so, the Moran court employed an interpreta-
tion of McNair that the Montana Supreme Court has refused to
utilize since it decided McNair.5
B. The 1972 Constitution
The 1972 Montana Constitution, although not as encompass-
ing as its 1889 counterpart,' expresses the intent that Montana's
educational system must encompass a broad range of activities in-
side and outside the classroom. The drafters recognized the critical
importance of education to every Montana citizen, and therefore
required that education be accessible to all. "Learning is gradually
being recognized as a process which extends from the early months
till the late years of life. A long range goal of the state should be to
foster and support this learning process for all citizens to the max-
imum level possible in any given era. ' 20 The Education Clause of
the 1972 Montana Constitution thus reflects Montana's commit-
ment to the individual development of its citizens.
The 1972 Constitutional Convention Transcripts set forth the
delegates' plan to fulfill the purpose of Montana's educational sys-
tem, namely, to provide the tools necessary for the citizens of
Montana to lead productive and satisfying lives.2 The transcripts
identify three broad concepts as essential to a healthy educational
system: (1) quality, (2) equality22 and (3) flexibility.23
17. Id.
18. In Granger v. Cascade County School District, 159 Mont. 516, 499 P.2d 780 (1972),
the Montana Supreme Court, interpreting the 1889 Montana Constitution, seemed to
weaken the strong definition of a "thorough system of public, free, common schools"
adopted in McNair, stating: "As long as the individual student is not deprived of equal
access to educational courses and activities reasonably related to recognized academic and
educational goals of the particular school system, the constitutional mandate is not vio-
lated." Id. at 526, 499 P.2d at 785. Justice Sheehy, in his dissenting opinion in Bartmess,
however, interpreted Granger as an affirmation of McNair.
[In Granger] this Court reaffirmed its statement that education may be directed
to mental, moral and physical powers, and provided this test: "Is a given course or
activity reasonably related to a recognized academic and educational goal of a par-
ticular school system? If it is, it constitutes part of the free, public school system
commanded by Article XI, Section 1 [of the 1889 Montana Constitution] ......
Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 283-84, 726 P.2d at 810 (Sheehy, J., dissenting) (quoting Granger,
159 Mont. at 527, 499 P.2d at 786).
19. The 1889 Montana Constitution contained express language that required the leg-
islature "to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free,
common schools." MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XI, § 1 (emphasis added).
20. II TaANSCRPTS, supra note 4, at 722 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 721-22.
22. Although equality is not specifically listed as a fundamental consideration of the
delegates, the transcripts contain other language which implies that equality of educational
opportunity is also of utmost importance to the delegates: "every child should have approx-
4




A quality education is the basis of a good citizenry and a
strong government.24 The Montana Supreme Court defined a
"quality education" in McNair, by emphasizing the importance of
non-academic activities.
[I]t is clear that the solemn mandate of the Constitution is not
discharged by the mere training of the mind; mentality without
physical well-being does not make for good citizenship-the good
citizen, the man or woman who is of the greatest value to the
state, is the one whose every faculty is developed and alert.25
Similarly, the constitutional convention delegates defined a "qual-
ity" educational system as "not simply a minimum educational
system, but one which meets contemporary needs and produce[s]
capable, well-informed citizens. '2 6 As both definitions demon-
strate, an individual needs a complete education that will at least
develop the skills necessary to survive in the outside world. Al-
though reading, writing and arithmetic provide a basic education,
they do not provide a complete education.2 7
2. Equality
Montana's education clause explicitly guarantees "equality of
educational opportunity" to all students in Montana.28 The 1972
Constitutional Convention delegates acknowledged the importance
of equality when they stated: "Society has accepted the duty to
support a quality educational system, and courts have stressed
that it must be made available on approximately equal terms. 2
The notion that the state of Montana should treat individuals
equally under the Montana Constitution is a familiar constitu-
tional concept enumerated in article II, section 4 (the Equal Pro-
imately the same opportunity to receive an adequate basic education." Id. at 724 (emphasis
added).
23. The transcripts enumerate quality and flexibility as "fundamental to the commit-
tee's considerations." Id. at 721-22.
24. Hubsch, supra note 1, at 96.
25. McNair, 87 Mont. 423, 428, 288 P. 188, 190 (1930) (emphasis added). Although
McNair was decided prior to the adoption of the 1972 Constitution, the Montana Supreme
Court continues to cite it in its decisions. For example, the Montana Supreme Court stated
in Bartmess: "The priority given to academic over non-academic work.., does not contra-
dict this Court's statement in McNair that physical and moral education are also impor-
tant." Bartmess, 223 Mont. 269, 276, 726 P.2d 801, 805 (1986) (emphasis added).
26. II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 4, at 724.
27. See infra section IV(B).
28. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(1).
29. II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 4, at 722.
1990]
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tection Clause). 0 This clause provides for "equal protection of the
laws."31 In 1908, while construing the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution, the Montana Supreme Court de-
fined "equal protection of the laws" as
equal security under [the laws] to everyone, under similar terms,
in ... life,... liberty .... property, and in the pursuit of happi-
ness, and exemption from any greater burdens and charges than.
. . [those which] are equally imposed upon all others under like
circumstances.... [Ihf a particular statute distributes its burdens
unequally upon those who occupy the same relation to its subject,
if it punishes one citizen for doing that which another may do
with impunity, if it abridges the liberty of one without imposing a
like restriction upon another, it does not furnish the "equal pro-
tection of the laws."
32
In order to guarantee equal protection of the laws, Montana must
therefore ensure that educational opportunities are offered to all of
its citizens.33
3. Flexibility
The constitutional convention delegates recognized the funda-
mental need for flexibility in order to accommodate the changing
needs of Montana's educational system. 4 Although it is not clear
30. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
31. See Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311
(1986) ("The equal protection clause [MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4] guarantees that similar
individuals will be dealt with in a similar manner by government."); In re C.H., 210 Mont.
184, 197-98, 683 P.2d 931, 938 (1984) ("Art. II, Sec. 4 of the 1972 Montana Constitution
[guarantees] equal protection of the laws to all persons.").
32. State v. Holland, 37 Mont. 393, 406, 96 P. 719, 722-23 (1908) (quoting 8
CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & PROCEDURE § 1059). Although written in 1908, the court has reiter-
ated this principle from Holland in cases decided after the ratification of the 1972 Montana
Constitution. See e.g., TIPCO Corp. v. City of Billings, 197 Mont. 339, 346, 642 P.2d 1074,
1078 (1982); Billings Assoc. Plumbing Heating & Cooling Contractors v. State Bd. of Plumb-
ers, 184 Mont. 249, 253, 602 P.2d 597, 600 (1979); Montana Land Title Ass'n v. First Am.
Title, 167 Mont. 471, 474, 539 P.2d 711, 712-13 (1975).
33. The Montana Supreme Court recently interpreted the phrase "equality of educa-
tional opportunity" in Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 769
P.2d 684 (1989).
[The framers] stated that equality of educational opportunity "is guaranteed" to
each person of the state. As we review our Constitution, we do not find any other
instance in which the Constitution "guarantees" a particular right. We conclude
that the plain meaning of [the Education Clause] ... is that each person is guar-
anteed equality of educational opportunity. The plain meaning of that [subsec-
tion] is clear and unambiguous.
Id. at 53, 769 P.2d at 689. For another discussion of the "equality of educational opportu-
nity" clause, see Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 279, 726 P.2d at 807 (Morrison, J., concurring).
34. II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 4, at 721.
[Vol. 51
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from the constitutional convention transcripts, perhaps the dele-
gates intended to use the local boards of trustees as vehicles to
implement their goal of flexibility.
Local control of individual school districts by boards of trust-
ees, as a complement to statewide regulation, helps state agencies
meet the needs of students in small communities as well as in
larger cities."s Local control of individual school districts is author-
ized by article X, section 8, of the 1972 Montana Constitution (the
Local Control Clause). 6 Pursuant to this article, the Montana Leg-
islature adopted statutes authorizing individual boards of trustees
to supervise and control particular school districts by promulgating
rules that govern student instruction, student behavior, and pro-
vide sanctions for violations.3 7
When interpreting this clause, the Montana Supreme Court
has recognized the need for flexibility in Montana's educational
system by supporting the discretion exercised by individual boards
of trustees.38 In Kelsey v. School District No. 25,11 the court
stated:
A wide discretion is necessarily reposed in the trustees who com-
pose the board. They are elected by popular vote, and, presuma-
bly, are chosen by reason of their standing in the community,
[their] sound judgment, and their interest in the educational de-
velopment of the young generation which is soon to take the place
of the old.40
35. Yanzick v. School Dist. No. 23, 196 Mont. 375, 389-90, 641 P.2d 431, 440 (1982).
The legislature has indicated its desire to place local control of schools in the local
school districts. . . . [Tihis Court quoted the proceedings of the 1972 Montana
Constitutional Convention in which the matter of local control was discussed by
delegates who stated: "[T]his body does want local control to remain with the
local school districts .... [W]e should give constitutional recognition and status
to the local boards to ... [preserve] . .. local autonomy."
Id. (emphasis in original).
36. The Local Control Clause provides: "The supervision and control of schools in
each school district shall be vested in a board of trustees to be elected as provided by law."
37. See generally, Title 20 of the MONT. CODE ANN. (1989). Montana statutes "em-
power school trustees to govern students within a school district, establish and maintain
instructional services, adopt standards for pupil behavior, and provide sanctions for viola-
tions of those standards." Respondent's Reply Brief at 17, Bartmess, 223 Mont. 269, 726
P.2d 801 (1986) (No. 85-540) (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 20-3-324, 20-5-201 (1989)). The
code further provides "that the Montana Board of Public Education must set minimum
standards for accreditation and instruction but local school districts may provide other in-
struction when approved by the local board of trustees." Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 20-
7-101, 20-7-111 (1989)).
38. Yanzick, 196 Mont. 375, 641 P.2d 431 (1982); School Dist. No. 12 v. Hughes, 170
Mont. 267, 552 P.2d 328 (1976).
39. 84 Mont. 453, 276 P. 26 (1929).
40. Id. at 458, 276 P. at 26.
1990]
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Although decided prior to the 1972 Montana Constitution, the
Montana Supreme Court has since reiterated the Kelsey rationale
by quoting it approvingly in Yanzick v. School District No. 23.1
Unfortunately the concepts of flexibility and equality may
conflict if individual boards of trustees are allowed to implement
rules more stringent than statewide requirements. Disparity be-
tween individual school districts may arise,42 creating the basis for
a claim that the school board's enactment violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Montana Constitution." Bartmess provides
an example of such a claim.
III. State ex rel. Bartmess v. Board of Trustees
A. The Facts
Lewis and Clark County citizens and "parents of students en-
rolled at the two Helena high schools" brought this action for de-
claratory and injunctive relief against the Board of Trustees of
School District No. 1 and High School District No. 1." The plain-
tiffs objected to a rule adopted by the Trustees. The 2.0 rule re-
quires that a student, hoping to participate in extracurricular ac-
tivities, including athletics, academic clubs, student government,
music, drama and speech, maintain a "C" or 2.0 grade point aver-
age for a nine-week period prior to participation."
In contrast to Helena's 2.0 rule, no other Montana "AA" high
school against which the two Helena high schools competed in ex-
tracurricular activities, maintained such a rigorous standard. 46
These other high schools followed the "D" or 1.0 grade point aver-
age rule promulgated by the Montana High School Association
(MHSA), a private organization. 7 Additionally, the two Helena
high schools failed to remain consistent. Specifically, the two
schools required only a 1.0 grade point average to graduate from
41. 196 Mont. 375, 390, 641 P.2d 431, 440 (1982) (quoting Kelsey, 84 Mont. at 458, 276
P. at 26).
42. See e.g., Helena Elementary School Dist., 236 Mont. 40, 769 P.2d 684 (1989).
43. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
44. State ex rel. Bartmess v. Board of Trustees, 223 Mont. 269, 271, 726 P.2d 801, 802
(1986).
45. Id. at 271, 726 P.2d at 802. Special Education students and students with learning
disabilities are exempted from the 2.0 rule. Id.
46. Id. at 281, 726 P.2d at 808 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
47. Id. The author does not argue that a "D" average is an acceptable standard. A
more stringent academic standard, such as the 2.0 rule, is a reasonable standard to impose
on students who wish to participate in extracurricular activities. However, the same stan-
dard should apply to all Montana high school students who wish to participate in extracur-
ricular activities, and therefore should be implemented by a statewide body such as the
legislature or the Montana Board of Public Education.
[Vol. 51
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Plaintiffs asked the court to declare the 2.0 rule unconstitu-
tional because it violated the Equal Protection and Education
Clauses of the Montana Constitution.49 The district court granted
summary judgment for the Board of Trustees, "declaring the 2.0
rule to be 'a reasonable, fair, equitable and non-discriminatory pol-
icy, promulgated for the purpose of implementing the constitu-
tional and [statutorily] mandated educational goals of the school
district.' "o The district court therefore held that the rule did "not
violate any constitutionally protected rights ....
B. The Majority Opinion
The court began its analysis by discussing the standard of re-
view applicable to an equal protection challenge. A court must first
determine whether the right involved is fundamental, or less than
fundamental.52 In Montana, a right is fundamental if it is: (1)
"found within Montana's Declaration of Rights," or (2) "a right
'without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have
little meaning.' ",5' After determining the nature of the right in-
volved, a court must evaluate the individual's infringed right and
the state's interest in regulating the individual's conduct to deter-
mine whether the state or the individual will prevail.54 To perform
this balancing, the court uses one of several different tests depend-
ing upon the nature of the right involved. When addressing a fun-
damental right, the court uses a "strict scrutiny" test, which re-
quires the state to prove that the state's action is based on a
"compelling state interest. 5 5 Rarely can the state meet this bur-
48. Id. at 281, 726 P.2d at 808 (Sheehy, J., dissenting). The 2.0 rule, as adopted in
Bartmess, is not supported by "any scientific or statistical studies showing academic im-
provement ... following the adoption of such a policy." Id. Currently, there are no state-
wide grade point average requirements for graduation from a Montana high school. See
ADMIN. R. MONT. § 10.55.905 (1990).
The author has reservations concerning the implementation of two separate academic
standards: one for graduation and a different one for participation in extracurricular activi-
ties. The author suggests that separate standards for graduation and participation in extra-
curricular activities undermine the goals of Montana's educational system. Academics and
extracurricular activities are inseparable components of education, and should be governed
by the same standard, statewide.
49. Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 271, 726 P.2d at 802.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 272, 726 P.2d at 803.
53. Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311 (1986);
See also In re C.H., 210 Mont. 184, 199, 683 P.2d 931, 940 (1984).
54. In re C.H., 210 Mont. at 197, 202, 683 P.2d.at 938, 940.
55. Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 272, 726 P.2d at 803 (emphasis added).
1990] 517
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den.56 Because of this high burden of proof, the Montana Supreme
Court is "hesitant to expand the number of categories of rights and
classes subject to strict scrutiny, when each expansion involves the
invalidation of virtually every classification bearing upon a newly
covered category."
Traditionally, if a state action violates "a right [that] is not
fundamental," a court applies a "rational-relationship" test.5 8 This
test requires the state to show only that the infringement is "ra-
tionally related to a legitimate government objective. '59 This stan-
dard is much easier for the state to meet.60
The Montana Supreme Court recently recognized a third
equal protection test. In Butte Community Union v. Lewis,6' the
court concluded that the right to receive welfare, though not a fun-
damental right, was sufficiently significant under the Montana
Constitution to require the state to show a substantial relationship
between the questionable welfare legislation and the important
state interest involved.2 The court held that if a right is not fun-
damental, but is important enough to require a stricter degree of
scrutiny than the rational-relationship test provides, the court will
use a "middle-tier" analysis63
In Bartmess, the court adopted the middle-tier analysis from
Butte Community Union and applied it to determine whether the
2.0 rule unconstitutionally infringed the Helena students' rights to
participate in extracurricular activities. 4 The court stated:
Our analysis of the educational provisions of our Montana Consti-
tution demonstrates there are competing and in some cases con-
tradictory viewpoints which must be considered in determining
whether the educational aspects of extracurricular activities are a
right under our Constitution. We conclude that the only standard
56. Id. at 275, 726 P.2d at 804.
57. Id. (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976)).
58. Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 272, 726 P.2d at 803.
59. Id.
60. Butte Community Union, 219 Mont. at 434, 712 P.2d at 1314; In re C. H., 210
Mont. at 199, 683 P.2d at 939.
61. 219 Mont. 426, 712 P.2d 1309 (1986).
62. Id. at 434, 712 P.2d at 1313-14.
63. Id. at 434, 712 P.2d at 1313.
64. Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 275, 726 P.2d at 804-05. The right to receive welfare bene-
fits and the right to an education, however, are distinguishable. The right to education is a
textually explicit right found in article X, section 1 of the 1972 Montana Constitution, while
the right to welfare benefits is not textually explicit. At least one justice recognized this
distinction as well. Justice Morrison wrote in his concurring opinion, "Education cannot be
characterized as merely a benefit as was welfare in Butte Community Union .... The right
to an education is not restricted in any manner. One need not qualify. Education is for all."
Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 278, 726 P.2d at 806 (Morrison, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
518 [Vol. 51
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of constitutional review which allows a careful balancing of these
competing interests is the middle-tier analysis.8 5
In applying this analysis, the court first acknowledged the impor-
tance of education, by suggesting that "various aspects of educa-
tion under our Montana Constitution could be classed as 'funda-
mental.' "66 The court then refused, however, to delineate which
aspects of education it perceived to be fundamental. Unfortu-
nately, the court held that participation in extracurricular activi-
ties was not one of the aspects qualifying as a fundamental right.6 7
Therefore, the court weakened the possible protection extended to
the Helena students' rights to participate in extracurricular activi-
ties by removing the possibility of using a strict scrutiny analysis. 8
In order for the 2.0 rule to pass the middle-tier analysis, the
Helena Board of Trustees then had only to prove "that its classifi-
cation [was] substantially related to an important governmental
objective." 9 The court concluded that the classification created by
the 2.0 rule was "a reasonable one."'70 In doing so, the Bartmess
court noted that although physical and moral development are im-
portant in Montana's educational system, "the government inter-
ests in developing the full educational potential of each person and
providing a basic system of quality public education by the enact-
ment of the 2.0 rule outweigh the students' interest in participat-
ing in existing extracurricular activities. '71
65. Id. at 275, 726 P.2d at 804.
66. Id. at 274, 726 P.2d at 804 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 275, 726 P.2d at 805. The Montana Supreme Court, citing San Antonio
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), acknowledged the fact that neither the right to
an education, nor the right to participate in extracurricular activities are fundamental under
the United States Constitution. Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 272, 726 P.2d at 803. It is important
to note that the United States Constitution does not contain language similar to the lan-
guage contained in Montana's education clause.
68. Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 274-75, 726 P.2d at 804.
69. Id. at 275, 726 P.2d at 805. In Butte Community Union, the court provided guid-
ance to determine when to use the middle-tier test.
A benefit lodged in our State Constitution is an interest whose abridgement re-
quires something more than a rational relationship to a governmental objective...
• Where constitutionally significant interests are implicated by governmental clas-
sification, arbitrary lines should be condemned. Further, there should be balanc-
ing of the rights infringed and the governmental interest to be served by such
infringement.
Butte Community Union, 219 Mont. at 434, 712 P.2d at 1313-14 (emphasis added).
70. Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 276, 726 P.2d at 805. "[T]he rule is an incentive for those
students who wish to participate in extracurricular activities. It also promotes adequate
time to study for those students who have not maintained a 2.0 grade average." Id.
71. Id. at 276, 726 P.2d at 805.
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C. The Dissent
Justice Sheehy, in his dissenting opinion, took a different ap-
proach to this dispute. He admonished his fellow justices for avoid-
ing the real issues involved in Bartmess.72 Justice Sheehy charged
the majority with the failure to address the discriminating effect of
the 2.0 rule implemented by the Helena Board of Trustees.
Although Justice Sheehy acknowledged the discriminatory na-
ture of the 2.0 rule, he failed to develop any analysis on the impor-
tant constitutional issue raised in Bartmess: Is the right to educa-
tion fundamental?73 Rather, Justice Sheehy limited his analysis to
refuting the majority's characterization of extracurricular activi-
ties. If Justice Sheehy had answered the question of whether the
right to education is fundamental he would have strengthened his
argument, and substantiated his conclusion. For example, if Jus-
tice Sheehy had stated that the right to education is fundamen-
tal 7  then, following McNair, he could have concluded that the
right to participate in extracurricular activities is fundamental as
well. Instead, Justice Sheehy quoted language from the 1972 Con-
stitutional Convention Transcripts to support his conclusion that
the right to participate in extracurricular activities is fundamen-
tal.75 Justice Sheehy's emotional appeal seems to set the stage for a
reconsideration of the majority decision by providing examples of
72. Id. at 285, 726 P.2d at 811 (Sheehy, J., dissenting). "We should not resort to high-
flown concepts of equal protection law.., to deny constitutional protection to these affected
students." Id. at 285-86, 726 P.2d at 811 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
73. Although Justice Morrison, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the decision
reached by the majority, he did not agree with the analysis used. Justice Morrison answered
the question that the majority refused to answer: Is education a fundamental right?
Justice Morrison began his analysis by discussing the United States Supreme Court
decisions which have held that education is not a fundamental right-namely, San Antonio
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972) and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1981). Bart-
mess, 223 Mont. at 276-77, 726 P.2d at 805-06 (Morrison, J., concurring). He then set the
stage for the remainder of his analysis by recognizing that Montana may adopt its own
analysis of education, assuming "independent state grounds exist for developing expanded
rights under our state Constitution." Id. at 277, 726 P.2d at 806 (Morrison, J., concurring).
Justice Morrison found that the requisite independent state grounds did exist. Specifi-
cally, Justice Morrison used language from the 1972 Constitutional Convention Transcripts
as support for the conclusion "that basic education is a fundamental right under the Mon-
tana Constitution." Id. at 278, 726 P.2d at 806 (Morrison J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Justice Morrison then employed a strict scrutiny analysis to determine whether the 2.0 rule
violated this right. Ironically, Justice Morrison found that the rule actually furthered the
state's "interest in educating its citizens," rather than inhibiting it. Id. at 280, 726 P.2d at
807 (Morrison J., concurring).
74. See supra section IV(A).
75. See infra note 87. In addition, Justice Sheehy cited several earlier Montana cases
which acknowledged the importance of extracurricular activities. Bartmess, 223 Mont. at
281-84, 726 P.2d at 808-10 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
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the discriminatory effect of the 2.0 rule.76
IV. MONTANA SHOULD RECONSIDER
A. The Right to Education is Fundamental
The people of Montana deserve a system of education that
provides instruction and opportunity for development inside and
outside the classroom. 7 By categorizing the right to an education
as something less than fundamental, and by ignoring the impor-
tance of extracurricular activities in Montana's educational system,
the Bartmess decision cripples the intended effect and meaning of
Montana's education clause. The Bartmess decision stands because
the Montana Supreme Court has failed to recognize that the right
to an education is fundamental.
The express language of Montana's education clause78 pro-
vides a strong basis for the Montana Supreme Court to decide that
the right to an education in Montana is fundamental.79 Moreover,
76. Justice Sheehy pointed out in his dissent:
Now a Helena High School girl with a 1.98 grade average and a good soprano voice
is excluded from singing with the Helena Starlighters. A Gary Cooper or a Myrna
Loy, both Helena products, may now be excluded from the Helena drama classes..
. In any test of fair dealing, those results should instantly be held irrational, but
this Court does not want to apply rationality standards. It wants to talk about
strict scrutiny and middle [tier] reviews to deny these students perhaps the only
time in their lives to use their God-given skills to run in track, to twirl batons, to
play in bands.
Id. at 285, 726 P.2d at 811 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
77. II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 4, at 721; see also supra notes 11-14 and accompanying
text.
78. For the text of Montana's education clause see text accompanying supra note 3. In
addition, "the constitutions of all fifty states have... recognized an affirmative obligation of
government to educate its citizens." Hubsch, supra note 1, at 96-97. For a complete listing
of the education clauses of all fifty states, see id. at 134-40 (appendix). Below is a list of
those clauses: ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIz. CONST. art. XI,
§ 1; ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONsT. art. IX, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, §
1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST. art.
VIII, preamble & § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, §1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. II,
ch. V, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1 & 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; Miss. CONST. art.
VIII, § 201; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); MONT. CONST. art. X §§ 1(1) & 1(3); NEB. CONST. art.
VII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1 & 2; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. LXXXIII; N.J. CONST. art.
VIII, § 4, I; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, §§ I &
2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST.
art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art.
X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1 & 2; W.
VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIs. CONST. art. X, § 3; Wyo. CONST. art. VII, § 1. Id.
79. Other state courts have interpreted constitutional language similar to Montana's
to establish a fundamental right to education. For example, in Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d
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delegates' comments at the 1972 Constitutional Convention Tran-
scripts imply that the delegates intended Montana's education
clause to create a fundamental right. "Education occupies a place
of cardinal importance in the public realm .... Because of the
overriding importance of education, this committee recognizes the
awesome task of providing the appropriate Constitutional provi-
sions necessary to protect and nurture the public educational sys-
tem."' 0 To interpret this language as anything other than the crea-
tion of a fundamental right would not fulfill the delegates' stated
intent.
If education does not qualify as an enumerated fundamental
right, then clearly it fits into the second of the two tests used to
determine if a right is fundamental: If a right is necessary for indi-
viduals to exercise other constitutionally guaranteed rights, then
that right is fundamental regardless of whether it is enumerated in
Montana's Declaration of Rights.a" Applying this test to education
reveals the fundamental nature of education.
Because an education is a prerequisite for participation in po-
litical or community activities, 2 society is obligated to educate its
citizens."3 A person who cannot read, for example, will have a diffi-
cult time exercising his or her fundamental right to vote.8" Hence,
550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976), the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted the language from
the Wisconsin Constitution, "equal opportunity for education," as a fundamental right. Id.
at 567, 247 N.W.2d at 149. The language of the Wisconsin Constitution, "equal opportunity
for education" is substantially similar to the language in Montana's education clause,
"equality of educational opportunity." See also Hubsch, supra note 1, at 114-15 n.1 (outlin-
ing eight other states which have found the right to education to be fundamental).
80. II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 4, at 721 (emphasis added).
81. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
82. Unlike the United States Supreme Court's holding in Rodriguez the California Su-
preme Court, in Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, (1971),
held that the right to education in California is a fundamental right. Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at
589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
The California court did not rely upon the explicitness of education rights in the
state constitution but, significantly, upon the nexus of education with citizenship:
"education is a unique influence on a child's development as a citizen and his
participation in political and community life." The California court concluded
that "the distinctive and priceless function of education in our society warrants,
indeed compels, our treatment of it as a 'fundamental interest.'"
Hubsch, supra note 1, at 125 (quoting Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 605, 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1256,
1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 616, 618).
83. Hubsch, supra note 1, at 99.
84. "In Rodriguez, it was argued that education is fundamental because it is essential
to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and the right to vote." Bartmess, 223
Mont. at 276, 726 P.2d at 805 (Morrison, J., concurring). The United States Supreme Court
in Rodriguez refused to give the right to education fundamental status. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
at 35 (1972). In a more recent United States Supreme Court case, Plyler v. Doe, the Court
reaffirmed its holding that education is not a fundamental right, but emphasized the impor-
522 [Vol. 51
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a lack of education inhibits, and may deny, a person's right to vote.
By holding that the right to education is anything less than funda-
mental, the court risks the effective denial of a fundamental, enu-
merated right-the right to vote.
In sum, Montana's "educational system is charged with the
task of shaping and cultivating the mind of each succeeding gener-
ation and with developing the capacities for cultural and techni-
cal advancement of society."85 Therefore, without an education,
individuals will find many doors in Montana closed to them.
B. Extracurricular Activities: An Essential Component of
Education
After determining that the right to an education is fundamen-
tal, a court needs to analyze the interplay between education and
extracurricular activities. The express language of Montana's edu-
cation clause, namely, "full educational potential of each person"
and "quality,""8 implies that extracurricular activities are not an
entity apart from education, but rather a fundamental component
of education. 7 Simply stated, the right to an education necessarily
encompasses the right to participate in extracurricular activities.
The two rights are inseparable.
Both the 1972 Constitutional Convention delegates and the
Montana Supreme Court have previously recognized the non-sev-
erability of these two rights. The Bartmess decision is a departure
from this principle and contravenes both the intent of the dele-
gates and prior court decisions. Specifically, the delegates defined a
quality education as "not simply a minimum educational system,
but one which meets contemporary needs and produce[s] capable,
well-informed citizens."88 Moreover, in McNair the court stated:
"Education may be particularly directed to either mental, moral,
tance of education to maintain society's "basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its
deprivation on the life of the child .... " Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 277, 726 P.2d at 806
(Morrison, J., concurring) (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221).
85. II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 4, at 721 (emphasis added).
86. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1.
87. At least one justice noted this principle in the Bartmess decision, stating,
We have been shown no record from the 1972 Constitutional Convention that
would indicate that the constitutional framers wanted to divert extracurricular
activities in schools from the other educational goals. Indeed, the language used
by the constitutional framers in 1972 seems to encompass physical development
in the term "educational potential." For this must be true, if nothing else is, that
the end of our educational system must be to develop students physically, men-
tally and morally to meet the challenges of life.
Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 285, 726 P.2d at 811 (Sheehy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
88. 11 TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 4, at 724.
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or physical powers or faculties, but in its broadest and best sense
it embraces them all."89 This language, from McNair, is instructive
because the court in Bartmess stated that it was not disturbing the
McNair holding.90 Therefore, Montana should not distinguish be-
tween academics and extracurricular activities when defining "the
full educational potential of each person.""
Montana could also look to courts in other states to determine
the role extracurricular activities play in education. Several of
these courts have held that extracurricular activities are an inte-
gral part of the educational process.2 The analyses of these courts
hinge on the role extracurricular activities play in the overall edu-
cation of the individual. These analyses are strikingly similar to
Justice Sheehy's analysis when he stated, "that participation in ex-
tracurricular activities is a fundamental ingredient of the educa-
tional process ....",,3
Finally, Montana courts could review recent studies that have
shown a significant relationship between participation in extracur-
ricular activities and academic success.94 One such study, per-
89. McNair, 87 Mont. at 428, 288 P. at 190.
90. Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 276, 726 P.2d at 805.
91. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(1). "A rule which places physical, educational and moral
development below mental education slaps at the three legs upon which the educational
stool is built." Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 286, 726 P.2d at 811 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
92. The California Supreme Court recognized the importance of extracurricular activi-
ties in Hartzell v. Connell, 35 Cal. 3d 899, 679 P.2d 35, 201 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1984):
It can no longer be denied that extracurricular activities constitute an integral
component of public education. Such activities are "'generally recognized as a
fundamental ingredient of the educational process.' "They are "[no] less fitted for
the ultimate purpose of our public schools, to wit, the making of good citizens
physically, mentally, and morally, than the study of algebra and Latin ......
Id. at 909, 679 P.2d at 42, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 608 (quoting Moran, 350 F. Supp. at 1184) (also
quoting Alexander v. Phillips, 31 Ariz 503, 513, 254 P. 1056, 1059 (1927)). See also Brenden
v. Independent School Dist. No. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir. 1973) (quoting Thomp-
son v. Barnes, 200 N.W.2d 921, 926 n.11 (Minn. 1972)) ("[Ilnterscholastic activities ... [are]
today recognized ... as an important and integral facet of the ... education process ....");
Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 293 F. Supp. 485, 493 (M.D. Tenn. 1968) (ex-
tracurricular activities are "generally recognized as a fundamental ingredient of the educa-
tional process."). For a discussion of the importance of athletics in California's educational
system, see Note, Protection of Public High-School Athletics Under the California Consti-
tution: Steffes v. California Interscholastic Federation, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 587 (1988).
93. Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 284-85, 726 P.2d at 810 (Sheehy, J., dissenting). Compare
also supra section II(A).
94. See e.g., M. Harvancik & G. Golsan, Academic Success and Participation in High
School Extracurricular Activities: Is There a Relationship? (August 1986) (available on
microfiche at the Mansfield Library, University of Montana, ED273887). Although the par-
ticular results from this study were inconclusive because of the use of student self-reported
material from ACT Assessment Reports, the paper provides a list of a number of studies
that did find a positive correlation between participation in extracurricular activities and
academic success.
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formed by the United States Department of Education, polled
"[olver 30,000 sophomores and 28,000 seniors enrolled in 1,015
public and private high schools across the Nation."9 5 This study
concluded that a significant relationship exists between extracur-
ricular activities and academic success." Experts in the field of ed-
ucation have noted the importance of extracurricular activities in
the educational process, because of the positive effect that extra-
curricular activity participation has on students' academic per-
formance. Denying students the right to participate in extracurric-
ular activities may have adverse affects on "student morale""7 and
consequently, academic performance. Thus, by refusing to protect
the right to participate in extracurricular activities, the Bartmess
court may have actually inhibited students' opportunity to succeed
academically, which would clearly contradict the intended purpose
of the Education Clause.
C. Equality v. Flexibility: The Bartmess Conflict
Montana's equal protection clause, in conjunction with Mon-
tana's education clause, creates a constitutional mantle which en-
compasses Montana's education system, and protects the individ-
ual educational rights of Montana citizens.98 These two clauses
create an affirmative duty to provide a quality system of education,
as well as guarantee that all Montana citizens will have access to
an education.99 Clearly, the Bartmess 2.0 rule invades this consti-
tutionally protected territory by allowing only certain Helena high
school students to participate in extracurricular activities.
The Helena Board of Trustees and other proponents of the 2.0
rule argued that courts in other states had upheld the constitution-
ality of rules similar to the Bartmess 2.0 rule.100 The rules dis-
cussed in those cases are distinguishable, however, from the 2.0
rule found in Bartmess, because the implemented rules had state-
95. OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., EXTRA-
CURRICULAR ACTIVITY PARTICIPANTS OUTPERFORM OTHER STUDENTS (Sept. 1986) (available on
microfiche at the Mansfield Library, University of Montana, ED279740).
96. Id. The study qualified its conclusions by recognizing that participation in extra-
curricular activities "does not guarantee improved performance" for a student. Id. The
study used four criteria, namely, "course credits, hours of homework, test scores, and grade
average." Id.
97. Id.
98. See supra section II(B)(2).
99. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
100. See e.g., Spring Branch v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1985) and Bailey v.
Truby, 321 S.E.2d 302 (W. Va. 1984) (cited in Respondent's Reply Brief at 11, Bartmess,
223 Mont. 269, 726 P.2d 801 (1986) (No. 85-540)).
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wide effect.101 In Bartmess, the Helena Board of Trustees regu-
lated Class "AA" statewide activities with a rule that affected only
those students enrolled in Helena School District No. 1.102
Consider the effect of the 2.0 rule. Conceivably, a high school
student in Helena could successfully graduate from high school
without ever having the opportunity to participate in any extracur-
ricular activities, even though extracurricular activities are an es-
sential component of Montana's education system. 103 If that same
Helena student were to move from Helena to Missoula to attend
high school, however, that student would then be allowed to par-
ticipate in extracurricular activities. This anomaly is created be-
cause the other "AA" high schools follow the MHSA guidelines re-
quiring only a 1.0 grade point average to participate in
extracurricular activities.
The extracurricular activities affected by the 2.0 rule include
not only activities performed in the Helena School District, but
also those performed statewide, for example, basketball and speech
competitions. In a situation involving statewide activities, all Mon-
tana "AA" high school students appear to be similarly situated.'0 '
Yet high school students in Helena are treated differently. Any
state action which limits the participation in statewide activities of
only high school students in Helena, therefore, should be
unconstitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
The Helena Board of Trustees, created under the Local Con-
trol Clause, 105 was provided with the authority to implement the
2.0 rule. The effect of this rule is that Montana students who wish
to participate in statewide extracurricular activities are affected by
the 2.0 rule only if they live in Helena. 10 6 The Bartmess case has
uncovered a potential conflict between the Education Clause, the
101. For example, the rule analyzed in Spring Branch v. Stamos, is actually a Texas
statute commonly referred to as the "no pass, no play" rule. TEx. EDUC. CODE. ANN. §
21.920(b) (Vernon 1987). For a discussion of the "no pass, no play" rule, see Comment, No
Pass, No Play Rules: An Incentive Or An Infringement?, 19 U. TOL. L. REv. 87 (1987). All
Texas students who wish to participate in statewide extracurricular activities are similarly
affected by the "no pass, no play" rule. TEx. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 21.920(b) (Vernon 1987).
102. Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 270, 726 P.2d at 802.
103. See supra part IV(B).
104. The Montana Supreme Court never reached this segment of the analysis. It is
unclear whether the high school students in Helena were not in a similar situation with
other "AA" high school students. From the facts of Bartmess, no difference is apparent that
would warrant unequal treatment of high school students in Helena.
105. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
106. Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 270, 726 P.2d at 802.
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Equal Protection Clause, and the Local Control Clause, which au-
thorizes the creation of individual boards of trustees. Because of
this conflict, discrimination exists. The effect of the 2.0 rule upon
high school students in Helena provoked Justice Sheehy to write in
his dissenting opinion, "[w]e have never had before us a scheme of
government so patently discriminatory. '10 7
If the Montana Supreme Court were to recognize the funda-
mental nature of education and therefore extracurricular activities,
the conflict between equality and flexibility would disappear. For
example, if education were recognized as a fundamental right, a
board of trustees would need a compelling state interest to restrict
students' rights to participate in extracurricular activities. The
Bartmess 2.0 rule would not meet this burden.
In 1990, the people of Montana will decide whether to recon-
vene a constitutional convention and revise the existing state con-
stitution. Without reservation, Montana has a progressive and via-
ble constitution, and yet, the Montana Constitution is not a
perfect document; some problems have arisen in the last eighteen
years. For example, Bartmess has demonstrated a conflict between
three clauses of the Montana Constitution, a conflict that must be
resolved. Bartmess also demonstrates the need to strengthen and
clarify the language in the Education Clause. A clarification of this
language would create a closer connection between the 1972 Con-
stitutional Convention delegates' intent, expressed in the conven-
tion transcripts, and the language of the Education Clause. Also, a
clarification of this constitutional language may force the court to
recognize that the right to an education is fundamental-a recogni-
tion that is long overdue.
107. Id. at 285, 726 P.2d at 811 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
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